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ABSTRACT: Michel Foucault has inspired a rich body of work in the field of critical social theory 
and the social sciences in general. Few scholars working in the area of social movement studies, 
however, have applied a Foucauldian perspective to examining the twin phenomena of social 
mobilization and collective action. This may stem, in large part, from the commonly held assump-
tion that Foucault had far more to say about ‘regimes of power’ than ever about mobilization and 
collective action or contention politics in general. Be that as it may, a close interrogation of his 
work reveals the broad contours of a theoretical framework for analyzing social movements 
whose chief merit lies in a sensitivity to the sociopolitical context within which oppositional 
movements form, develop and conduct their operations. 
This paper aims at delineating what a Foucauldian model of social movements would en-
tail, with specific reference to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), a region traditionally 
consigned to the margins of social movement studies. An enquiry of this kind is important be-
cause, as I argue, the leading mainstream social movement theories that have been applied to con-
temporary MENA cases invariably fall short of fully elucidating the phenomenon of mass mobili-
zation. Specifically, leading mainstream theories are prone to certain universalistic assumptions 
and ‘West-centric’ orientations that render them incapable of accounting for the specificities of 
MENA cases. I shall demonstrate how a Foucauldian perspective on social movements can by-
pass the problem of applicability to the MENA region by mapping out a theoretical framework 
whose chief merit lies in a sensitivity to the sociopolitical context within which oppositional 
movements form, develop and conduct their operations. At the same time, I argue that a Fou-
cauldian model transcends social movement theories with their linear conception of social and 
political progress, their exclusivist understanding of sociopolitical ‘development’ and ‘modernist’ 
assumptions by advancing an account of ‘multiple modernities’. 
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This paper aims at delineating what a Foucauldian model of social movements would entail, with 
specific reference to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), a region traditionally consigned 
to the margins of social movement studies.1 An enquiry of this kind is important because, as I 
shall argue, the leading mainstream social movement theories that have been applied to contem-
porary Middle East and North African cases invariably fall short of fully elucidating the phenom-
enon of mass mobilization, the chief reason being that they were developed in Western liberal 
democratic polities, and more specifically “in the context of . . . reform movements . . . in the US 
and Western Europe,”2 where collective action is viewed in a positive light as “a forc[e] for pro-
gress toward democracy.”3 This stands in stark contrast to the case in the MENA region, where 
oppositional movements are viewed as a dire threat by a number of states prepared to use what-
ever force necessary to preserve the status quo. In these settings, mass social movements tend to 
form, develop, and operate in circumstances where “contention faces huge constraints” and 
where “the collective dimension of protest is far from [a] given.”4  
All this has led Asef Bayat to question “how far prevailing social movement theor[ies] 
[are] able to account for the complexities of [social] movements in contemporary [MENA] socie-
ties,” given that they were developed in “highly differentiated and politically open Western socie-
ties,”5 and therefore reflect, as Steven Buechler reminds us, the “structural features of [those] soci-
eties.”6 Specifically, and as I will argue, leading mainstream theories are informed by universal 
assumptions and ‘modernist’/‘Western-centric’ orientations that render them incapable of ac-
counting for the specificities of MENA cases. 
In the first part of the paper, I examine the applicability of leading mainstream theories to 
MENA social movements with a view to identifying their apparent deficiencies in this regard. 
Having emerged in the 1960s as a field in its own right, social movement studies would branch 
into various schools and traditions. This enquiry focuses solely, however, on those leading main-
stream theories, both American and European, that have been applied to, or have referenced, the 
                                                 
1 This point has been raised by various leading social movement theorists. See, for example, C. Kurzman, ‘Con-
clusion: Social movement theory and Islamic studies,’ in Q. Wiktorowicz (ed), Islamic Activism: A Social Move-
ment Theory Approach (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp. 289-298; see also D. McAdam, 
D. J. McCarthy, & M. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Struc-
tures, and Cultural Framings (eds), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. xiii-xiii.  
2 E. P. Oliver, J. Cadena-Rao, & D. K. Strawn, ‘Emerging trends in the study of protest and social movements,’ 
Research in Political Sociology, 12(1), 2003, p. 215 (https://doi.org/10.1016/s0895-9935(03)12009-8). 
3 R. Garner, and J. Tenuto, Social Movement Theory and Research (London, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 1997), p. 5. 
4 J. Beinin & F. Vairel, Social movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa, (eds.), 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011), p. 19. 
5 A. Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East (Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 2013), p. 4.  
6 S. Buechler, ‘New social movement theories,’ The Sociological Quarterly, 3(3), 1995, p. 447.  
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phenomenon of social mobilization in the Middle East and North Africa. In the course of delineat-
ing the historical contexts and conditions giving rise to these theories, I shall analyze their key 
assumptions regarding oppositional movements to assess how far such assumptions can account 
for the specificities, e.g., the organizational structure, leadership, modes of solidarity building, 
and domains of protestation and contestation of social movements in contemporary MENA socie-
ties. 
In the second half of the paper, I articulate a Foucauldian-inspired model of social move-
ments, delineating how it can, by virtue of its sensitivity to the contexts and settings within which 
social movements form, develop and conduct operations, and elucidate the sociopolitical process-
es underpinning them. At the same time, I argue that in presenting an account of ‘multiple mo-
dernities,’ a Foucauldian model transcends social movement theories with their linear conception 
of social and political ‘progress,’ exclusivist understanding of sociopolitical ‘development,’ and 
‘modernist’ assumptions.  
 
Mainstream Social Movement Theories: Origins and Foundational Assumptions 
In the United States, dominant social movement theories took their inspiration chiefly from the 
civil rights, national student liberation and anti-war movements of the 1960s. While each of these 
had a specific agenda—a legislated end to racial segregation, radical reform of the education sys-
tem, and the withdrawal of US troops from South Vietnam, respectively—all were “self-
consciously” politically oriented and looked exclusively to Washington for remedies.7 All were 
perceived, moreover, to be “forces for progress toward democracy,”8 and on the basis of two as-
sumptions: “democracy materializes in the context of social movement activism;”9 and “social 
movements emerge vis-à-vis “opportunities and constraints afforded by [the liberal democratic 
state].” 10  
Resource mobilization theory (RMT), one of “the dominant paradigm(s) for studying col-
lective action in the United States,” seeks to explain how, in light of political opportunities, i.e., 
conditions in the political system that either facilitate or inhibit collective action, actors come to 
recognize and seize opportunities to initiate action.11 From this perspective, the resources availa-
ble to oppositional groups prior to mobilizing, and the ways in which these are pooled and em-
ployed, play a critical role in determining how they make their presence felt and the level of effort 
                                                 
7 D. Davis, ‘The power of distance: Re-theorizing social movements in Latin America,’ Theory and Society, 28(4), 
1999, p. 594; emphasis added. 
8 Garner & Tenuto, Social Movement Theory, p. 5. 
9 Davis, ‘The power of distance,’ p. 599. 
10 Garner & Tenuto, Social Movement Theory, p. 23. 
11 Buechler, ‘New social movement,’ p. 441. 




they can bring to bear to affect social and political change.12 In this schema, structured leadership 
emerges as a pivotal aspect of social mobilization; indeed, for leading RMT theorists such as 
McCarthy and Zald, this factor plays a key role in identifying and defining grievances and ex-
ploiting opportunities to initiate collective action. According to these luminaries, “[o]nly after a 
well-defined leadership emerges do we find well-defined group action.”13 
RMT focuses primarily on economic factors—cost-reducing mechanisms, career benefits 
for cadres, the division of labour, management incentives—which speak to the centrality of ag-
gregated resources, chiefly money and labour, to promote collective action.14 Seen in this light, the 
emergence, endurance and impact of a social movement organization (SMO) will hinge largely on 
the capacity to collectivize “what would otherwise remain individual grievances”15 — a capacity 
predicated upon such factors as effective communications and the degree of professionalism 
among SMO staff. Thus, a central tenet of RMT holds that “social change requires a high level of 
technical expertise.”16  
Other strands of social movement theory developed by American scholars shift the focus 
from the human and material resources available to SMOs to the political environment in which 
they operate.17 The best known of these is ‘political process theory’ (PPT). Among social move-
ment analysts, PPT is viewed as a “hegemonic paradigm” that has “powerfully shap[ed] [the 
field’s] research agenda.”18 According to this model, it is the opening up of political opportunities, 
or the ‘structure of political opportunities,’ that provides a window of opportunity for collective 
action. Doug McAdam identifies three ‘consensual’ dimensions of political opportunity used to 
explicate the emergence of social movements: 1) access to a political system which reflects the 
degree of its openness; 2) intra-elite competition and/or elite allies who encourage or facilitate 
collective action; 3) a declining capability on the part of the state to repress oppositional move-
ments.19 These three broad structural factors have been joined recently by a fourth, namely exter-
                                                 
12 See, for example, J. C. Jenkins, ‘Resource mobilization theory and the study of social movements,’ Annual Re-
view of Sociology, 9(1), 1983, pp. 527-553; D. J. McCarthy& N. M. Zald, ‘Resource mobilization and social move-
ments: A partial theory,’ American Journal of Sociology, 82(2), 1977, pp. 1212-1240.  
13 D. J. McCarthy& N. M. Zald, The Trends of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobiliza-
tion (Morristown, N.J: General Learning Corporation, 1973), p. 17; emphasis added. 
14 See, for example, McCarthy & Zald, ‘Resource mobilization,’ pp. 1215-1217; see also A. Oberschall, Social Con-
flict and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973).  
15 Q. Wiktorowicz (ed), Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 2004), p. 10.  
16 Garner & Tenuto, Social Movement Theory, p. 23.  
17 See, for example D. McAdam, D. J. McCarthy, & M. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements; H. 
Kitschelt, ‘Political opportunity structures and political protest: Anti-nuclear movements in four democracies,’ 
British Journal of Political Science, 16(1), 1986, pp. 57-85 (https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712340000380X). 
18 J. Goodwin & J. M. Jasper, Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and Emotions, (eds.), (New York: 
Littlefield Publishers, 2004), pp. 3- 4. 
19 McAdam et al., Comparative Perspectives, p. 26. 
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nal factors broadly understood as international/geopolitical pressures that can provide “favorable 
conditions” or “open[] up … opportunit[ies]” for a movement to emerge.20 
As the above suggests, PPT aims to advance a universal, causal theory of social move-
ments predicated upon a set of structural factors, i.e., “factors that are relatively stable …and 
…outside of the control of movement actors.”21 For the most part, it is the susceptibility on the 
part of the state to popular political pressure, coinciding with the public’s awareness of that sus-
ceptibility and willingness to exploit it, which triggers the mobilization of a mass movement.  
In Europe, the new social movement theories were directed at addressing what was 
deemed to be a deficiency in classical Marxism, namely a tendency toward economic and class 
reductionism. Regarding the former, all politically significant social action had to be grounded in 
the economic logic of capitalist production, “[with] . . . all other social logics secondary at best in 
shaping such action.”22  
Against this background, new social movement theories emerged rooted in traditions of 
continental European social theory and political philosophy, which was used to reformulate the 
historical theory of emancipation.23 With new social movements springing up in Europe in the 
1960s—the student movements that erupted in 1968, in addition to the environmental, feminist, 
ecological, and anti-nuclear movements, among others—social movement theorizing assumed a 
direction that was both “non-class and ‘new’ [in terms of] social and political logic.”24  
One feature of the new social movements stands out in particular: they were theorized in 
the context of a historically specific phase in the development of Western liberal societies; an at-
tribute that, as Steven Buechler observes, speaks to “the most distinctive feature of new social 
movement theories.”25 To be precise, while different theories prescribe clearly differentiated mod-
els—post-industrial society,26 post-materialist society,27 advanced capitalist society,28 information 
                                                 
20 J. Markoff, ‘Response to Jack Goldstone,’ in McAdam et al., Comparative Perspectives, p. 53; see also McAdam et 
al., Comparative Perspectives, pp. 25-29. 
21 Goodwin & Jasper, Rethinking Social Movements, p. 4.  
22 Buechler, ‘New social movement,’ p. 442. 
23 See, for example, J. Cohen, ‘Strategy or identity? New theoretical paradigms and contemporary social move-
ments,’ Social Research, 52(4), 1985, pp. 663-716; B. Klandermans, ‘New social movements and resource mobiliza-
tion: The European and American approaches revisited,’ in D. Rucht (ed), Research on Social Movements: The State 
of the Art in Western Europe and the USA (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag; Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 
1991), pp. 17-44; E. Larana, H. Johnston, & J. R. Gusfield, (eds.), New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997).  
24 Davis, ‘The power of distance,’ p. 594. 
25 Buechler, ‘New social movement,’ p. 443.  
26 A. Touraine, The Return of the Actor: Social Theory in Postindustrial Society (Minneapolis: University of Minneso-
ta Press, 1988). 
27 R. Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies (Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).  
28 J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975).  




society,29 etc.—contingent upon the specific constituencies and issues under examination, they 
have one commonality: all operate based upon, and work to reference, a type of “societal totality” 
closely bound up with the new structural features emerging in Western Europe that were precipi-
tating new patterns of sociopolitical action as the old order was dissolving—in the process 
providing a context for collective action.30 In investigating the ‘post-industrial’ nature of this total-
ity—an historical stage, indeed, the highest level of historicity—Touraine pits it against its ‘indus-
trial’ predecessor with a view to examining new patterns of sociopolitical action and the condi-
tions governing their emergence— a crucial point I shall revisit shortly when gauging the ap-
plicability of his theory to MENA societies. 
 
Social Movement Theories and Specificities of MENA Oppositional Movements 
As the above discussion reveals, American social movement theorists view social movements as 
‘parcels’ of collective action that present, for the most part, an “organized, sustained, self-
conscious challenge to existing authorities.”31 In the “politically open and technologically ad-
vanced Western societies”32 in which they emerge, they evolve to operate, more or less, as formal 
‘business-like enterprises’ whose success is ultimately contingent upon resources, leadership, a 
clear-cut division of labour, professionalization and strategic planning, etc.; in other words, fac-
tors relating to technical expertise. It is, moreover, by acts of mobilization and protestation, chief 
among them petitioning and lobbying, that the actors engage and influence mainstream political 
institutions, e.g., parliaments, houses of representatives, political parties, etc. with a view to 
bringing about change.33  
But what of those political settings where ‘mobilizing structures’ such as formal organiza-
tions and professional staff are either non-existent or rudimentary and/or severely handicapped 
by authoritarian states, where acts of mobilization, e.g., petitioning and lobbying, are ineffectual 
with respect to pressuring governments unaccountable to oppositional voices, and /or where the 
political channels for effecting meaningful change or bringing social and political reform are con-
trolled by factions that have a monopoly over certain exercises of power?  
Home to a number of states where mobilizing structures have been ruled out, the MENA 
region can serve as an ideal laboratory in which to examine these questions. Among the countries 
of the region, Bahrain, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran—each with a unique brand of authoritarian-
ism—represent outstanding cases of states that have historically, and to varying degrees, proven 
most adept at denying their opponents opportunities to recruit professional staff and establish 
                                                 
29 A. Melucci, Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996).  
30 Buechler, ‘New social movement,’ p. 442; emphasis added. 
31 C. Tilly, ‘Social movements and national politics,’ in C. Bright & S. Harding (eds.), State-Making and Social 
Movements: Essays in History and Theory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), p. 304.  
32 Bayat, Life as Politics, p. 20 
33 See Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
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formal organizations.34 Consequently, in each case oppositional groups have, for the most part, 
been driven underground, from where they have conducted clandestine activities.  
Where such groups operate in plain view, they are closely monitored by state security 
forces and their cadres are often subjected to intimidation and harassment, or even arrest and im-
prisonment. Oppositional leaders, moreover, are “routinely harassed and intimidated, placed 
under house arrest [, exiled] and/or incarcerated for long periods,”35 or worse, executed.36 One or 
more of these fates have befallen Mohammed Saleh Al-Bejadi and Sheikh Nimr Baqir Al-Nimr 
(Saudi Arabia), Mohammad Mosaddegh, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi (Iran), and 
Sheikh Ali Salman and Ibrahim Sharif (Bahrain). 
Even in the case of Iran during the administration of the reform-minded Mohammad 
Khatami (1997-2005), efforts on the part of oppositional and civil society groups to advance a re-
form agenda through official channels, such as the Majlis, the Iranian Parliament, were severely 
handicapped or blocked entirely by, to cite but one example, the so-called ‘religious supervisory 
bodies’ like the Guardian Council, which since the beginning of the early 1990s has been domi-
nated by a conservative establishment that has had the final say in adopting legislation.37 
For a prime example of the enormous influence wielded by certain factions holding a mo-
nopoly of power, one need look no farther than the failure on the part of the Majlis in the early 
2000s to ratify the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) – a United Nations initiative hailed by feminists as an international bill of rights for 
women. If adopted, CEDAW would have directly challenged a host of laws, customs and practic-
es that had worked to marginalize and subordinate women. Following a press campaign by Irani-
an feminists aimed at pressuring the government to deliver on its promise to “reconcile Islam 
with democracy and human rights” by adopting CEDAW, the Khatami administration, in De-
                                                 
34 I use the phrases ‘each with its own unique brand of authoritarianism’ and ‘to varying degrees’ here to differ-
entiate these states in terms of the opportunities afforded oppositional movements. Thus, for example, a republi-
can, semi-democratic Iran under the reformist government of Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) promoted the 
development of a civil society in which student and women’s movements could operate with some degree of 
impunity; indeed, this was the case until Ahmadinejad’s rise to power. Nothing of the kind has ever been possi-
ble in the far more authoritarian milieus of Syria and Saudi Arabia, where oppositional groups have historically 
had little or no opportunity to engage in any kind of subversive action. 
35 N. Pourmokhtari, ‘Understanding Iran’s Green Movement as a ‘movement of movements,’ Sociology of Islam, 
2(3), 2014, p. 148 (https://doi.org/10.1163/22131418-00204004).  
36 See, for example, Independent News, ‘Nimr Baqir al-Nimr: Saudi Arabian Shia cleric who denounced the 
kingdom's rulers and called for religious freedom,’ 2016, available from 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/nimr-baqir-al-nimr-saudi-arabian-shia-cleric-who-denounced-
the-kingdoms-rulers-and-called-for-a6798061.html>.  
J. Butler, ‘Bodies and alliance and the politics of the street,’ European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies, 2011, 
available from: <http://www.eipcp.net/transversal/1011/butler/en>, para. 1 
37 See, for example, M. Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
2002), pp. 30-34.  




cember 2001, drafted the requisite legislation and submitted it for ratification to a reformist domi-
nated Majlis.38 However, immediately prior to the final vote, the enabling bill was placed on hold 
owing, according to the speaker Mehdi Karoubi, to ‘concerns’ on the part of conservative clerics 
regarding its compatibility with Shari’a law, the sacred law of Islam.39  
Pressured by activists, reformist deputies would, over the course of the following two 
years, demand an official enquiry, but to no avail. Finally, in August 2003, the Guardian Council 
announced that the CEDAW bill would not be ratified.40 Thus, it is apparent that in political set-
tings like Iran, efforts to bring about social and political change by working through official chan-
nels are invariably frustrated by factions holding a monopoly over certain exercises of power.  
When combined, all the above factors—the closed political environment, government 
crackdowns on oppositional cadres, the inefficacy of the acts of mobilization aimed at pressuring 
the state to adopt social and political reforms—imbue oppositional movements in the region with 
certain specificities. For example, far from posing an “organized [and] sustained … challenge to 
existing authorities,”41 as is often the case with oppositional movements in the ‘West,’ in the 
MENA region, collective action takes the form, more often than not, of “open and fleeting strug-
gles [waged] without [formal] leadership, ideology or structured organization.”42  
Relatedly, and herein lies a second specificity, among those Middle East states where so-
cial and political reform is likely to be blocked or at least hampered by factions possessing a mo-
nopoly over power, where open political channels simply do not exist, and/or where oppositional 
groups are denied political rights, particularly where challenging government policy is con-
cerned, mobilizing actors may seek out ‘alternative spaces,’ most often of a public kind, in which to 
voice their demands, forge solidarities and/or express discontent, thus transforming them into 
‘spaces of resistance and defiance.’  
In the case of the MENA region, it is the urban streets in particular that lend themselves 
most readily to contesting the status quo. Ali Mirsepassi labels this spatial phenomenon the “tra-
dition of democracy in the streets.”43 A sine qua non for expressing discontent in the region, it is a 
“consistent and powerful aspect of … protest movements”44 across much of the Middle East and 
North Africa, e.g., the 1979 Iranian revolution, the 1994 uprising in Bahrain, the so-called ‘upris-
                                                 
38 Z. Mir-Hosseini, ‘The conservative-reformist conflict over women’s rights in Iran,’ International Journal of Poli-
tics, Culture and Society, 16(1), 2002, p. 38 (https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016530427616).  
39 See. N. Tohidi, ‘“Islamic feminism”: Negotiating patriarchy and modernity in Iran,’ in I. M. Abu-Rabi (ed.), The 
Blackwell companion to contemporary Islamic thought (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 624-643.  
40  Feminist News, ‘CEDAW rejected in Iran,’ 2013, available from 
<http://www.feminist.org/news/newsbyte/uswirestory.asp?id=7996>. 
41 Tilly, ‘Social movements and national politics,’ p. 304.  
42 Bayat, Life as Politics, p. 46. 
43 A. Mirsepassi, Democracy in Modern Iran (New York: New York University Press, 2010), p. ix.  
44 Ibid., p. ix (https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9780814795644.001.0001).  
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ing of dignity,’ the 1999 Iranian student movement, and the mass demonstrations in Yemen, 
Egypt, Tunisia and Bahrain, and elsewhere in the region, in this century.  
Asef Bayat discusses this transformative potential of MENA streets under the rubric of 
“street politics,” defined as the participative use of streets for the purpose of “express[ing] griev-
ances, forg[ing] identities [and] enlarg[ing] solidarities.”45 In this way, he asserts, “a small demon-
stration [can] grow into a massive exhibition of solidarity” aimed at contesting and negating the 
status quo.46 Thus, streets have become, in effect, the locus for a ‘tug of war’ between the state and 
the masses. And “[i]t is [owing to] this epidemic potential of street politics” that, not surprisingly, 
“almost every” major case of contention in MENA has ultimately “[found] expression in the ur-
ban streets.”47  
I want to suggest here, moreover, that public spaces generally in the MENA region have 
become a kind of politics in the sense of serving as mediators through which social and political 
conflict and contestation originate and develop. Thus, it might be more to the point to talk about a 
kind of ‘spatial politics’ unfolding during the course of some of the well-known episodes of con-
tention that have periodically erupted across the MENA region over the past three decades. In 
this context, the term ‘spatial politics’ refers to a feature or strategy of defiance used by demonstra-
tors to transform governmentalized zones into strongpoints where marginalized, subordinated, and 
subjugated bodies might defy power, and by implication the very ‘regimes’ it sustains.  
The ‘political’ in ‘spatial politics’ has a dual meaning. First, it refers to the disruption of the 
ordinary sequence of things, what Asef Bayat calls “the normal flow of [everyday] life,”48 in ways 
that, as Judith Butler opines, challenge and negate the “very public character of … space,”49 best 
described as ‘meticulous or methodical,’ ‘fluid’ and/or ‘disciplinized’ and above all ‘governmen-
talized.’ In this sense, what lends ‘public spaces’ a ‘political’ dimension is that while they have 
“increasingly becom[e] the domain of …state power”50—which “regulates their use [and] mak[es] 
them “orderly””51 through a host of laws and regulations—they have also become, simultaneous-
ly and contingent on the will of the masses, “[loci for] “shaming” the authorities.”52 In this way, 
and most vexing for the latter, they have been turned into spaces of resistance and sites of politi-
cal contestation and social negation of the status quo. Thus, it is hardly surprising that Iran’s 
Azadi Square (2009), Egypt’s Tahrir Square (2011 – 2012) and Turkey’s Taksim Square (2013) 
should emerge as chief signifiers for mass discontent during the recent spate of uprisings in 
which each figured prominently. In all three cases, it would be the gathering of immense crowds 
                                                 
45 Bayat, Life as Politics, p. 13.  
46 Ibid., p. 13. 
47 Ibid., p. 13.  
48 Ibid., p. 21.  
49 J. Butler, ‘Bodies and alliance,’ para. 1.  
50 Bayat, Life as Politics, p. 53. 
51 Ibid., p. 53.  
52 Mirsepassi, Democracy, p. ix.  




that demonstrated in a most telling way the power and vitality of these movements, whose actors 
managed to de-legitimatize and de-authenticate ‘governmental regimes’ before the eyes of the 
world by occupying these governmentalized zones, thereby disrupting the normal flow of every-
day life.  
At the same time, the ‘political’ in ‘spatial politics’ can also refer to the strategic role urban 
spaces play in advancing the cause of social and political reform; as such, they function as an al-
ternative to acts of contestation and protestation, e.g., lobbying and petitioning, as well as surro-
gate channels for pursuing reforms and demanding change where formal political institutions, 
parliaments, senates, and legislative assemblies have failed. To appreciate the extent to which 
public spaces have fulfilled this function in the MENA region over the course of the last three 
decades, we need look no farther than the numerous instances where urban spaces have been 
converted into sites of contestation and negation. 
Thus, for example, in an effort to bring about political and socioeconomic reform in June 
1994, over 1,500 Bahrainian activists held a sit-in demonstration in front of the headquarters of the 
Ministry of Labor.53 This single event led to a series of uprisings (1994 – 1999) that would serious-
ly undermine the Al Khalifa monarchy, bringing into question its very legitimacy. These manifes-
tations of a profound discontent would also be among the first post-ideological54 cases of collec-
tive action within the region. 
On July 9th 1999, in the aftermath of the Tehran University dormitory attack by paramili-
tary groups affiliated with the conservative establishment,55 50-60,000 demonstrators, the majority 
students and youth, poured into the public spaces of Tehran and other major cities to express 
their discontent with the status quo; in addition, sit-ins were held on university campuses—a 
public space under close scrutiny by the police and paramilitary forces—their purpose being to 
express discontent, demonstrate solidarity and demand radical social and political reform.56 Thus, 
by massing in unprecedented numbers and occupying governmentalized public spaces, the 
crowds succeeded in challenging the Islamic Republic’s ‘governmentalizing regime,’ including its 
                                                 
53 Refworld, ‘Routine abuse, routine denial: Civil rights and the political crisis in Bahrain,’ 2006, available from: 
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formidable security apparatus, and in the process undermine Tehran’s moral and political author-
ity as never before.57  
August 2006 witnessed in Iran the launch of the so-called Women’s One Million Signatures 
Campaign. One of the most momentous cases of contention of the post-revolutionary period, this 
initiative aimed at petitioning the Majlis to repeal family, civil, and criminal laws that discrimi-
nated against women – most notably those relating to divorce, polygamy and temporary mar-
riages.58 The campaign workers would soon experience the wrath of the Mahmood Ahmadinejad 
administration: many were arrested and/or imprisoned, while others had their passports confis-
cated to prevent them travelling abroad.59 In response, the campaigners occupied streets, boule-
vards, shopping centers, civic squares, shops, the metro, buses and taxis, and whatever was at 
hand, transforming them into sites of contestation and negation.60 Various oppositional tactics 
were employed in these venues, but the most popular and effective is what will be referred to 
here as ‘spatial theatre.’ Thus, for example, in one especially popular ‘skit,’ two activists, suppos-
edly married to the same man, engaged in a heated argument, sometimes accompanied by mock 
fisticuffs, during which each reveals how this polygamous relationship has worked to undermine 
her rights, dignity and authenticity as a woman. Spatial theatre would become the campaign’s 
signature tactic61 for bringing about reform by “creat[ing] a [public] discourse on women’s rights” 
to which the authorities had to respond.62 
These kinds of initiatives did not always have favourable outcomes.63 The point to be 
grasped here, however, is that in all the cases discussed above, the demonstrators elected to en-
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gage in a so-called ‘politics of space’ when they found that the formal, i.e., institutional, avenues 
for effecting change were either inadequate to the task or blocked entirely. Thus, for example, in 
the years and months leading up to the Bahrain uprising, opposition groups sought to re-
form/democratize the political process by repeatedly petitioning the government. In each case, 
however, their efforts proved fruitless.64  
In similar fashion, on the eve of the July 1999 Tehran demonstrations, efforts on the part of 
students to bring about social and political reform were being systematically “sabotaged … by 
totalitarian Islamists” within the legislative and judicial branches of the Islamic Republic, who 
were determined to defeat reformist measures being put to the vote in the Majlis.65 The same fate 
would befall the 2006 One Million Signatures Campaign when its efforts to pressure the Majlis to 
ratify CEDAW and rescind discriminatory laws against women proved fruitless.  
Thus, unable to work through official channels, disparate opposition groups were left with 
no choice but to appropriate urban spaces as an alternative avenue for expressing discontent and 
voicing demands in ways the authorities could ignore only at their peril. By engaging in ‘spatial 
politics,’ these groups succeeded in “mut[ing] [politics] within [spaces] … supposed to be its nat-
ural and [normal] habitat”,66 e.g., the Majlis, and in transforming urban spaces, i.e., ‘governmen-
talized zones,’ into political loci of defiance whose very existence served to de-authenticate the sta-
tus quo and de-legitimize the political system as a whole. Thus, in both the Iranian and Bahraini 
cases, ‘spatial politics,’ that signal feature of defiance and principal strategy for conducting con-
tention episodes, may be viewed as “a capacity for action” directed at contesting the status quo—
a capacity “that specific [power] relations…create[d]…enable[d], [and motivated].”67  
Lastly, what instilled a sense of solidarity and commitment to engage in collective action 
within these disparate elements was the shared experience of having lived within the same ‘gov-
ernmental space,’ and thus having had to abide by codes and rules of governing that worked to 
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deprive them of their social and political rights. To take but one example, as Ali Abdi, a former 
2006 One Million Signatures Campaign worker, asserted during an interview with the writer: 
 
Rather than any ideological inclination, it was the conviction among the campaign workers that 
the status quo was unjust so far as women were concerned and that existing laws discriminated 
against them that fostered a sense of solidarity among campaigners and fired them with a de-
termination to engage in collective forms of activism. All this transpired during Ahmadinejad’s 
presidency, when the security forces, which were omnipresent, would not hesitate to arrest, 
imprison and/or beat up, if necessary, members of oppositional groups, in particular campaign 
workers. Nonetheless, many male activists elected to join the campaign, because they, too, 
wished to end the state-sponsored patriarchy that had worked to subordinate and marginalize 
women.68 
 
This convergence of disparate actors, which may be viewed as a kind of ‘spatial solidarity’ in-
formed by common rules of conduct, would enable moments of social contestation and/or social 
rupture, even where, as in Ahmadinejad’s Iran, surveillance and repression orchestrated by the 
“most reactionary and repressive elements of the Islamic Republic” were part of the fabric of eve-
ryday life.69 Thus, the term ‘spatial solidarity’ is used here in reference to the coming together of a 
people bent upon collective action and united by virtue of being ruled within the same govern-
mental space, and by implication by the rules, codes and norms that define that space. It is this 
condition of being ruled in such a way that inspires collective action, even in circumstances where 
“repression has … left its mark.”70 This is because authoritarian states and their overweening use 
of power can create the conditions of possibility for challenging certain rules, codes, and norms, 
and do so in diverse spatial domains. In this sense, ‘spatial solidarity’ “mirror[s]” the ways in 
which “[s]paces of resistance are bound up with … spaces of power and domination.”71  
 
Applying Political Process Theory to MENA Cases 
For its part, political process theory (PPT) is hampered by certain presuppositions that limit its 
efficacy for analyzing oppositional movements based in the MENA region. Owing to the heavy 
emphasis placed on structural conditions, PPT theorists see mass mobilizations, ultimately, as a 
response to opportunities that reveal “the vulnerability of the state to popular political pres-
sure.”72 As such, political opportunities capable of triggering mass mobilizations are viewed met-
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aphorically as “‘windows’ that open and close,”73 i.e., “they are either there or not there.”74 From 
such a perspective, oppositional movements are assumed to be comprised of agents possessing an 
a priori and mechanistic essence, i.e., they constitute “potential groups with preexisting desires . . 
. who only await the opportunity to pursue them.”75 This disposes PPT theorists to focus by and 
large on the “state or the polity as the only field of struggle that really matters” where mobiliza-
tion and collective action are concerned.76  
This fetishization of the state as “an entity presenting social movements with opportunities 
…to mobilize is highly problematic,”77 at least with respect to MENA states like Syria, Bahrain, 
Saudi Arabia, and Iran, where such opportunities are seldom, if ever, presented by governments 
determined to maintain the status quo at whatever cost. Thus, “[t]hose dissidents courageous 
enough to transgress the narrow limits of public discourse imposed by the state risk arrest, ‘show 
trials’ [and long jail terms],”78 as was the case in Iran in the post-Green Movement era,79 or even 
execution, as was the fate of Sheikh Nimr Baqir Al-Nimr in Saudi Arabia.80 Thus, it is hardly cred-
ible that oppositional movements would have open opportunities to mobilize in political envi-
ronments of this type.  
These realities compel us to seek out factors other than ‘open opportunities’ to mobilize ex-
tant in the political environment if we are to plumb the root causes of collective action in the 
MENA region. Some recent cases of mobilization in this context are instructive in this regard. For 
example, in the case of the 2009 Iranian Green Movement, as I have shown elsewhere, far from 
the state providing such opportunities, it was the oppositional forces—chiefly students, youth, 
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and women’s groups—that took the lead, or so it has been argued, in creating them.81 All three 
were motivated in part by discriminatory policies implemented by the Ahmadinejad administra-
tion during its first term in office (2005-2009), and in part by the widespread perception of elec-
tion fraud. At no time during this period, or prior to it, did the state provide anything that might 
be construed as an opportunity to mobilize.82 Thus, opportunity was “what [they made] of it.”83  
Two years later, a wave of protests would sweep through Tunisia, revealing the authorita-
tive will of disparate peoples longing for the kind of fundamental change that alone might usher 
in a brighter future. Again, one might argue that those who filled the streets created their own 
opportunities—opportunities that may be viewed as attributes of the actors themselves. Perhaps 
nothing better illustrates this last point than a solitary act of defiance on the part of a young Tuni-
sian street vendor named Mohammad Bou’azizi. In December 2010 Bou’azizi set himself ablaze to 
protest the arbitrary confiscation of his wares and the harassment and humiliation suffered at the 
hands of a municipal official and her aides. This single incident triggered massive demonstrations 
throughout the country, precipitating what would come to be called the ‘Arab Spring.’ 
Thus, with respect to the Green Movement and this first flowering of the ‘Arab Spring,’ 
one might argue that the demonstrators felt compelled to put their lives on the line, spurred on by 
moral outrage directed at governments that had violated their sense of justice beyond the point of 
endurance. In such circumstances, a people may come to perceive themselves as agents of social 
and political change, as actors capable of advancing their interests and possessed of a sense of 
authority, legitimacy, and subjectivity stemming from the certainty that the status quo is funda-
mentally unjust—actors determined to leave their mark on history “under circumstances they 
have the power to change.”84  
 
New Social Movement Theories and their Application to MENA Cases 
The lived experience of those who filled the streets of Iranian and Tunisian cities demanding 
change, which will be elaborated upon below, is reflected nowhere in the new social movement 
theories, which is not surprising given that they take as their datum the technologically advanced 
and politically open societies of the West. For this reason, they are prone to making grand and 
monolithic assumptions about social movements, which makes their application highly problem-
atic in the Middle East and North Africa. Touraine’s much celebrated post-industrial society theo-
ry, which rests upon the assumption that history unfolds as a succession of stages, i.e., ‘commer-
cial,’ ‘industrial’ and ‘post-industrial,’ is a case in point. According to this luminary, post-
industrial societies have attained an unparalleled level of historicity—the highest to be precise—
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wherein societal movements are no longer conceptualized as “dramatic events,” but rather as “the 
work that society performs upon itself.”85 Henceforth, Touraine contends, in post-industrial socie-
ties “there can be no societal movement other than the collective actions that are aimed directly at 
the affirmation and defense of the rights of the subject—of his freedom and equality.”86 For this 
reason, the new “societal movements have become moral movements,” vis-à-vis their predeces-
sors that were of a religious, political or economic character.87 
Touraine uses this last point to articulate the concept of ‘levels of historicity,’ from which 
he derives the corollary that only post-industrial societies can achieve the “highest level of histo-
ricity,” namely, that of self-production.88 In contrast, ‘traditional’ societies still “lie within histo-
ry,” and for this reason, their ability to produce the cultural models that govern how they func-
tion is more limited because the distance that historicity requires (from God, oneself and the 
world as object) has not been achieved.89 In terms of the opposition constructed here, i.e., between 
post-industrial and traditional societies, MENA societies still ‘lie within history’ being too close to 
god and therefore too preoccupied with religious concerns. Thus, they lack the kind of ‘moral 
movements’ that are a hallmark of the post-industrial societies of the West—not to mention post-
industrial economies, the sine qua non for attaining the highest level of historicity along Touraine’s 
evolutionist continuum. 
The best that may be said about such overarching theorization is that it reflects a historical-
ly specific period of Western history; at its worst, Arturo Escobar opines, it conceives Third World 
societies, and by implication their oppositional movements, “as lacking historical agency or … as 
only having a diminished form of agency compared with the European case.”90  
The above discussion reveals that the new social movement theories as well as their Amer-
ican forebears, which were formulated in light of European and North American experiences and 
trajectories, “coevolved with the relatively stable popular democracies of the West,”91 and, by im-
plication and despite all “claims to universality,” are predicated upon a set of “historically-
specific developments occurring in the United States [and] Europe.”92 It is for this reason, Charles 
Kurzman asserts, that “apply[ing] contemporary social movement approaches [to social move-
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ments in non-European and non-North American contexts]” presents so formidable a challenge.93 
Despite this caveat, however, the leading social movement theories have, as was shown above, 
acquired a hegemonic status predicated upon their universalizing assumptions and grand causal 
narratives, their efficacy in constructing general categories for social movements, and their refer-
encing of what is assumed to be the uniquely Western phenomenon to modernity. All this has 
profound implications for conceptualizing MENA oppositional movements, of which one in par-
ticular requires elucidation: their so-called essentialist nature.  
MENA oppositional movements are construed as ‘exceptionalist’ cases, a view stemming 
from an understanding of these movements as rooted in a religious revivalism of a strictly ‘fun-
damentalist’ nature, and hence divorced from anything deemed to be even remotely utopian or 
progressive. Thus, for example, both Alberto Melucci and Alain Touraine conceptualize MENA 
oppositional movements, e.g., the 1979 Iranian Revolution, in terms of a ‘regressive utopianism’94 
or as ‘anti-movements,’95 respectively, thereby reducing them to a manifestation of ‘Islamic fun-
damentalism’—in effect dismissing them as reactionary, anti-democratic, and anti-modern 
movements instigated by ‘traditional’ peoples.  
Other luminaries, e.g., Sidney Tarrow, express similar views, referring to the Middle East 
of the 1990s, for example, as a land of ‘ugly movements’ “rooted in ethnic … claims [or] in reli-
gious fanaticism and racism”96 and dominated by “radical Islamic fundamentalists who slit the 
throats of folk singers and beat up women who dare to go unveiled.”97 These accounts work ulti-
mately to relegate MENA movements to the margins of scholarly analysis where they are dis-
missed as ‘exceptionalist’ cases.  
The positions taken by Melucci and Touraine can surely be questioned given that their 
‘modernist’ assumptions and ‘Western-centric’ orientation work to consign oppositional move-
ments in the MENA region, along with the societies from which they spring and the conditions 
governing their emergence, to grand categories; the defining feature of which is an essentialism. 
Thus, for example, one can trace in Touraine’s thought how his normative concept of ‘levels of 
historicity’—according to which only social movements in the post-industrial societies of the 
West can achieve the highest level, a standing that lends them their ‘progressive’ and ‘modern’ 
character and which distinguishes them from all other societies, i.e., those that still ‘lie within his-
tory’—leads him inexorably to dismiss the 1979 revolution as an ‘anti-movement.’ 
Equally intriguing are the totalizing accounts of MENA societies presented by these theo-
rists, wherein a ‘religio-centrism,’ assumed to be the defining feature of ‘Islamist movements’—
the latter viewed almost exclusively as backward movements embedded in religious revivalism, 
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replete with primordial loyalties and signifying the peculiar and unique98—is cast as the engine 
of, as well as dominant code for, social mobilization. Thus, for example, in his account of a ‘re-
gressive utopianism,’ Melucci asserts that such movements, whose defining feature is a “totaliz-
ing monism,” forge their “identit(ies) in terms of the past, drawing on a totalizing myth of re-
birth.”99 Melucci contends that these cases, of which the 1979 Iranian revolution is an exemplar, 
represent nothing more than “a mythical quest for the Lost Paradise … [which] crystalizes into 
fanatic fundamentalism.”100  
Such assertions are like a “god trick,” to borrow Donna Harraway’s phrase—voices pre-
tending to offer a vision that is “from everywhere [but in fact] nowhere.”101 There lies in these 
accounts little interest in uncovering the layers of constituencies, histories, diversities and trajec-
tories that propel Middle Eastern movements forward. And yet, the historical record is clear: The 
Iranian Revolution of 1979 was a reaction on the part of diverse societal groups, including, but 
not limited to, nationalists, social democrats, leftists, and Islamists, all of whom took to the streets. 
It was, in fact, the Ayatollah Khomeini’s call for, and pledge to promote, pluralism in the post-
Shah era—and in particular the statements to this effect issued during his brief period of exile in 
France—that rallied these diverse elements to his cause—a cause that would receive additional 
momentum by repeated claims on his part to have no interest in governing the country.  
At the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution, moreover, Iran possessed, contrary to popular 
belief, nothing remotely resembling a strong Islamist movement; rather, the latter was at an early 
stage of development when overtaken and eclipsed by the events of February1979. Asef Bayat 
makes this point abundantly clear in a comparative analysis of the sociopolitical impact of Islam-
ism upon Iran and Egypt, which shows that in the former, vis-à-vis the latter, it was the very ab-
sence of a strong Islamist social movement that was partially responsible for precipitating a popu-
list revolution “led by the radical clergy and carried out by the popular mobilisation of various 
sectors of the population.”102 Only well after the revolution was consolidated and the Islamic state 
established did Islamization proceed and eventually triumph.  
It is against this background that one must judge the merits of Tarrow’s claim that the Af-
ghani Taliban constituted a “movement that took its inspiration from the Iranian revolution of 
1979,” and of his description of the Middle East of the 1990s as a land of ‘ugly movements,’ i.e., as 
a locus of violence and fundamentalism steeped in racist sentiment and religious fanaticism.103 
The point here is not to deny that the MENA region was and remains home to a number of ‘ex-
tremist’ movements, including the Taliban and the more recent so-called Islamic State in Iraq and 
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Syria (ISIS); rather, it is to suggest that during the 1990s some remarkably progressive movements 
emerged in the region—indeed, the first post-Islamist movements to advocate pluralism, the rule 
of law and human rights and to embrace student, youth and women’s groups104— a point lost 
amidst the ‘exceptionalist’ tendencies that inform much of what passes for scholarly analysis of 
MENA movements.  
Undeniably, some of the more recent cases of mobilization to emerge in the Middle East 
and North Africa call into question the totalizing and exceptional accounts that some dominant 
social movement theories advance, as well as the presuppositions they foreground about cases of 
protestation and contestation in the MENA region specifically. For example, the 2009 Iranian 
Green Movement and its counterparts in Tunisia (2011) and Egypt (2012) have been labeled ‘post-
Islamist’ owing to their reformist impulses, rejection of religious doctrine as the basis of govern-
ment policy, and willingness “to accommodate [certain] aspects of democratization.”105 This new 
political sensibility may be the harbinger of the demise of ‘Islamism’ as a sociopolitical project, 
i.e., “… as a complete social, political, economic, and moral system.”106 
This begs the question of what role, if any, Islam, or more precisely ‘political Islam,’ played 
in these recent developments. This question cannot be addressed, argues Olivier Roy in his analy-
sis of the uprisings in Tunisia (2010) and Egypt (2011-2012), with reference to the “Islamism [vs.] 
secularism” dichotomy; it can, however, be constructively framed by focusing on “the issue [of] 
religiosity,” i.e., “of the way people experience their relationship to religion, the way they experi-
ence their faith.”107 This observation is for Roy a point of departure from which to conclude that, 
far from a lack of religiosity and/or a decline in religious practices among disparate groups en-
gaged in oppositional action in the two countries, one can speak of a new reality: “an individuali-
zation of faith and diversification of the religious field” that has taken place “outside the debate 
[of] Islam,” or, to be more precise, outside of the debate of “Islamism [vs.] secularism.”108 
And herein lies the crucial point to grasp for anyone wishing to understand the recent cas-
es of mass mobilization in the region: the demand for human dignity, freedom, good governance 
and citizenship rights implicit in the signature refrains of the Egyptian, Tunisian and Iranian de-
monstrators, namely “bread—freedom—human dignity,” “Tunisia Tunisia free free, Bin Ali is 
out” and “where is my vote?” respectively cannot be understood without taking account of the 
profound transformations that had, over the course of three decades, irrevocably altered the so-
cial and political sensibility of disparate classes, ethnic groups and religious sects. 
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Chief among these was a massive demographic shift after a region-wide baby boom that 
had begun in the 1980s. The experience of Tunisia and Iran is instructive in this regard. As Cesare 
Merlini and Olivier Roy note, “[t]he current young generation” in Tunisia is the “last from a peri-
od of wild population growth” that, though contained in the 1990s by the introduction of family 
planning programs, had effectively turned the country into a relatively young nation by the dawn 
of the new millennium.109 Thus, by 2013, of a population numbering 10.6 million, a full 51 percent 
was under the age of 30.110 
In the case of Iran, rapid population growth was promoted for reasons of national security. 
Shortly following the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War (1980 – 1988), the authorities launched a se-
ries of family policies in response to the heavy toll the war was taking on the country’s manpower 
reserves. More births would in time translate into more soldiers, thereby fulfilling Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s dream of an artesh-e 20 millioni, an army of 20 million – a force that would effectively 
safeguard the Islamic Republic.111 Note that these policies would remain in force until the end of 
the conflict in 1988, at which point the authorities realized that, if sustained, rapid population 
growth would far exceed the country’s carrying capacity. Nonetheless, their long-term conse-
quences would prove dramatic; by 2013 out of a population numbering 77 million,112 60 percent 
were under the age of 30.113 
In both the Tunisian and Iranian cases, more youth translated into more university stu-
dents,114 giving rise to a generation far better educated than their parents, and as a consequence 
“less defined by the traditional patriarchal society at large” and less susceptible to the “appeal of 
traditional ideologies, be they Arab, nationalist, or Islamist.”115 Tunisian and Iranian youths thus 
saw themselves in a new and profoundly different way: as both bearers and agents of fundamen-
tal social and political change that would spell the demise of the old order and the birth of a new 
one that was democratic, individualistic and urban. Thus, it should come as no surprise that in 
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Tunisia the mass mobilization of 2010 would thereafter be known as the “youth uprising” and 
that the language of youth would be adopted in “defense of the revolution”116 
In this “new sociological context,”117 moreover, a yearning for ‘good governance’ would 
supplant ideological commitment, and ‘citizenship rights’ would trump the ‘religious duty’ em-
bedded in the sociopolitical project of ‘Islamism,’ which stripped of its religious veneer may be 
seen to constitute a mono-politicized calculus for governing. Yet, as to the role ‘Islam’ played in 
the mass movements in Egypt, Tunisia and, one might add, Iran, “[t]he stress,” according to Oliv-
ier Roy, “is on individual belief [and] individual faith, not on collective belonging to the ummah, 
or community of believers, or on blindly following the ulama (Muslim scholars).”118 Put different-
ly, what these recent events reveal is “a transformation in religiosity,”119 i.e., “a process of indi-
vidualization of faith and diversification of the religious field,”120 one that marks, according to 
Hamid Dabashi, the “epistemic exhaustion of ideological Islamism … as [a] categor[y] that can 
generate ideas, sustain convictions, and [inspire] movements.”121 
From the preceding discussion, one might conclude, at least with reference to the cases de-
lineated above, that recent mass movements in the Middle East and North Africa are not neces-
sarily ‘theory-confirming’ in that, however generally conceived, they do not conform to the chief 
presuppositions underpinning dominant social movement theories; nor are they, as was shown in 
the Tunisian case, for example, ‘exceptionalist,’ a view that works to dismiss nearly all Middle 
Eastern cases as regressive, fundamentalist and anti-modern, thus subjecting them to totalizing 
narratives and in the process relegating them to the margins of social movement studies. 
It is against this backdrop that MENA specialists have called for theoretical innovation 
that aims at moving beyond the trans-historical, grand causal, universalistic models and totaliz-
ing/exceptionalist narratives that currently dominate the field with a view to accounting for the 
specificities of MENA cases, e.g., the authoritarian settings in which they emerge and develop.122 
The remainder of this paper will focus on delineating one such approach. 
 
A Foucauldian Model of Social Movements 
 
I would like my books to be a kind of toolbox that people can rummage through to find a tool 
they can use however they wish in their own area . . . I don’t write for an audience, I write for 
users, not readers. 
— Michel Foucault123 
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 Social movements are dynamic and complex entities that must be interrogated primarily as “his-
torical phenomen[a] [unfolding] in a span of time.”124 Thus, it follows that “the search for univer-
sally valid propositions and models, at least for anything so complex as social movements, is 
bound to fail.”125 It is thus imperative to acknowledge that “historical specificities [giving rise to 
any form of collective action] are never entirely reproducible.”126 If Bayat, Goodwin and Jasper, 
and Beinin and Vairel are correct, a comprehensive analysis of social movements must take into 
account the particular settings in which they emerge and conduct operations—a consideration 
that compels us to be ever cognizant of the “situationally contingent” mechanisms that inspire 
disparate forms of social movements and collective action. 127  Both Charles Tilly and Saba 
Mahmood underscore this point by warning against advancing universalizing and totalizing ac-
counts of social movements; the latter raising serious doubts regarding the possibility of “identi-
fy[ing] universal categor[ies] of acts… outside of the ethical and political conditions within 
which” they acquire their relevancy,128 and the former contending that such analyses obscure fac-
tors such as history, time, and place that are pivotal to explicating diverse forms of social mobili-
zation.129  
A Foucauldian perspective offers a timely and much needed alternative to this line of en-
quiry. Foucault was a ‘nominalist’ in the sense that he rejected the presupposition that human 
and social phenomena have an essential, unchanging character.130 For this reason, his rich and 
diverse contributions to historical and sociopolitical enquiry work to problematize all that is con-
sidered absolute, eternal and universal, and in the process invite the reader to view social phe-
nomena as events and processes that showcase the ‘radical historicity’ of that which is studied.131  
Given his stance on historical nominalism and aversion to grand theory, Foucault con-
ceives theorization as an endeavour that is always tentative, contextual and socio-historically spe-
cific.132 In this vein, he conceives theorization, in and of itself, as a form of situated practice: “theo-
ry does not express, translate or serve to apply practice: it is practice,” i.e., it is a “local[ized] and 
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regional” system of struggle against power and thus contingent upon the setting in which it is 
applied.133  
 
Foucault, Collective Action and Movements of Counter-Conduct 
Within the corpus of Foucault’s work, a vantage point for analyzing social movements may be 
discerned in his writings on power, or more precisely governmental power, understood as “the 
way[s] in which the conduct of individuals or groups might be directed.”134 In essence, it is “a 
mode of action upon actions of others” predicated upon specific knowledges, techniques, meth-
ods and mentalities.135 Thus, Foucault conceives the exercise of power in terms of bringing to bear 
the appropriate combination of such techniques, methods and mentalities. This is not to imply, 
however, that in modern societies power is, or can ever be, entirely coercive, for “what makes 
power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it does not only weigh on us a 
force that says no.”136  
Being an object of power “does not [necessarily] mean that one is trapped,” for the very ex-
istence of power relations has as its corollary the possibility of resistance.137 As Foucault famously 
postulated, “where there is power, there is resistance;” without it, there can be, in fact, no rela-
tions of power, but only a state of domination where the subject has no room whatsoever to ma-
neuver.138 Thus, resistance is an integral aspect of power that embodies the possibility of defiance, 
disruption and subversion, a theme taken up in, among other works, his History of Sexuality, 
wherein it is demonstrated that “bodies and pleasures” can serve as “a base of operations” for a 
“counterattack against the deployment of sexuality,” which in the process gives rise to and makes 
possible a counter-discourse that disrupts the power relations sustaining the dominant discourse 
on sexuality.139 
It is thus apparent that, for Foucault, rather than being resisted by a force external to it, 
power is opposed “precisely at the point of its application.”140 This means that it operates on the 
individual in two ways: first, he/she is subject to the constraints of social relations of power; sec-
ond, and simultaneously, he/she can and may take up the position of a subject in and through 
those very constraints. This is what Foucault calls ‘subjugation’ or ‘subjection,’ a term that de-
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notes the co-constitutive nature of power and resistance, i.e., while one can conceive power as a 
heteronomous, multiple and expansive phenomenon, one can also speak of “a multiplicity of 
points of resistance” made possible through the disparate mechanisms of power.141  
The question this co-constitutive relationship raises has to do with, specifically, how Fou-
cault’s formulation of governmental power and resistance translates into a theoretical framework 
for elucidating social movements, the forms they assume and the conditions governing their 
emergence. 
In his elucidation of the power-resistance nexus, Foucault identifies those moments of his-
torical singularity when a people subjected to the techniques and mechanisms, discipline, and 
normalizing ‘gaze’ of the modern state feel compelled to initiate various forms of collective re-
sistance. These moments, as Foucault understands them, manifest “the strategic codification of 
[various] points of resistance,” leading to “great radical ruptures [and] massive binary divi-
sions”142 between the two poles dividing the conductors, i.e., those who govern, and the conduct-
ed, i.e., the governed. Such moments of radical rupture embody, for Foucault, materialized ways 
to resist power, which are expressed in the form of full-fledged demonstrations and protestations, 
and whose possibilities are enabled through what he calls movements of counter-conduct. 
A movement of counter-conduct may be broadly defined as a “[collective] struggle against 
the processes implemented for conducting others.”143 Such movements represent a collective re-
jection of the status quo by a people preoccupied with the question of “how not to be governed 
like that, by that, in the name of those principles, in view of such objectives and by the means of 
such methods, not like that, not for that, not by them.”144 Thus, it is not a question of whether one 
ought to be led, but rather why and how one must be led in a particular way and to such a de-
gree. Or, to take an extreme case, actors engage in collective action for the sake of demanding 
governance “by other conductors [and] towards other objectives.”145  
As will be shown here, the principles, attributes and features Foucault assigns movements 
of counter-conduct can be used to construct a theoretical framework with which to examine op-
positional movements as both have the same aim: to contest power. Indeed, just as the former seeks 
to circumvent or replace specific ways of conduct for the purpose of contesting power techniques 
in the service of governmental regimes, social movements, however conceived and constituted, 
also challenge ‘governmental regimes,’ and by implication their power, at the level of both prin-
ciples and practices of governance. Both do so by engaging in various forms of collective action 
aimed at advancing specific social or political agendas or resisting or reversing government poli-
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cies, which in the process mobilize “people with [a] common purpose and solidarity” in systemat-
ic interaction with elites and their functionaries.146  
Analyzing social movements through a counter-conduct lens, however, constitutes “a par-
ticular style of analysis”147 in that while it does not abandon key concepts—the state, society, 
agency, and the mobilization of actors/agents pivotal to social movement studies—it eschews 
their application in a rigid and universalistic manner to all scenarios, cases and contexts. Instead, 
all are to be treated as “‘transactional realit[ies],’” as entities that have “not always existed’ but 
are “nonetheless real” and “born precisely from the interplay of relations of power and every-
thing which constantly eludes them.”148 Thus, the chief merit of the analytical framework to be 
employed here lies in its sensitivity to contingency, i.e., that of concepts and ideas in relation to 
historical processes specific to particular localities, which in turn opens up a theoretical space to 
elucidate specific formations of social movements, understand the conditions governing their 
emergence, and interrogate the mentalities that drive them to embrace collective forms of action. 
Movements of counter-conduct emerge at those historical junctures when certain configu-
rations of power, and by implication knowledge, have become so intolerable as to leave mobiliza-
tion, demonstrations and protestations the only remaining avenues for expressing discontent. 
This is why for Foucault they possess the attribute of singularity; they appear upon the scene at 
those historical junctures when “life can no longer be bought”149 and/or when “no power can con-
tinue to rule over a people who refuse to be intimidated by death.”150 Such singular moments, 
however, do not possess the attribute of universality, nor do they encompass a laundry list of at-
tributes that can be applied to every contentious situation, hence Foucault’s dictum that there ex-
ists “no pure law of the revolutionary.”151 Nonetheless, they may arise when a people give “pref-
erence to the risk of death over the certainty of having to obey,” which is “that moment when life 
will no longer barter itself.”152 Under such circumstances, they will refuse to be governed by such 
principles, laws and regulations and will begin to speak and act against a governmental regime; 
and they will do so “with a single voice.”153 Not surprisingly, then, such moments are the by-
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products of the reciprocal interaction of state and society; more specifically, they are contingent 
upon “a form of schematization appropriate to a particular technology of government.”154   
Nowhere does Foucault highlight the role of this reciprocal interaction in producing 
movements of counter-conduct more, perhaps, than in his analysis of the 1979 Iranian revolution, 
where he introduces the concept of ‘political spirituality’ to describe the principal “mode of re-
sistance to the Shah:”155 
 
For the people who inhabit this land, what is the point of [contestation and demonstration], 
even at the cost of their own lives, for this thing whose possibility [can only be realized by] a po-
litical spirituality[?]156  
 
It would appear that this ‘political spirituality’ encompasses an understanding on the part of the 
people that to change society they must first change themselves, i.e., “renew their entire exist-
ence” by undergoing a spiritual experience, or more precisely, “a spiritual experience that they 
thought they could find with-in Shi’ite Islam.”157 And far from constituting some kind of ‘irra-
tional resurgence’ of a peculiar and/or regressive type, which Foucault is at great pains to clarify, 
it is a function and at the same time a by-product of Iran’s history, and by implication, that of the 
Pahlavi ‘governmentalizing regime’: “[W]hen I say that they were looking to Islam for a change in 
their subjectivity,”158 I mean it in the sense that “there was something other than the desire to 
obey the law more faithfully,”159 and that something was, it bears repeating, “the desire to renew 
their entire existence,”160 in the teeth of “a modernization that [was] an archaism”161—a most 
compelling oxymoron for the “Shah’s [greatest] crime.”162  
This so-called ‘archaic modernization’ was part Turkish-inspired “Kemalist program… of 
modernization,”163 and part yearning for a return to the grandeur and glory that was ancient Per-
sia—a fantasy the Iranian monarch “cling[ed] to … as if it were his sole raison d’être.”164 This 
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grand social and political project was to be realized by “a corrupt and despotic system”165 and 
enforced by the SAVAK, the Shah’s dreaded secret police. In 1979, Foucault concludes, it was 
“[t]his archaic] modernization [that was] utterly rejected” by the great mass of a people caught up 
in an irresistible revolutionary wave.166 
This last point suggests that what “was at stake in Iran was a revolt of subjectivity,” one 
“that cannot be explained solely in economic terms” à la European models of revolutionary ideol-
ogy.167 Indeed, “the very fact of [its] singularity,”168 i.e., “[the] coincidence of religion and politics 
in the form of a political spirituality that embodied political spontaneity on the part of the popu-
lace” accounts, at least in part, for Foucault’s fascination with the Iranian revolution,169 which he 
labels a “revolt that is the most modern and the most insane.”170 This means that, ultimately, his 
analysis can be viewed as a seminal work upon which to build a “theory of multiple modernities 
or multiple projects of modernity.”171 Put differently, in the Iranian case, a “political spiritualty 
had been born that owed nothing to Western models of [collective action].”172   
This explains why Foucault’s perspective on the 1979 revolution as a case of counter-
conduct—in particular his concept of ‘political spirituality’ and focus on ‘multiple modernities’—
is so germane to understanding MENA oppositional movements. It transcends “Western models 
of revolutionary ideology and sociopolitical progress,” and by implication the exclusivist and lin-
ear understanding of sociopolitical ‘development’, as well as the ‘modernist’ assumptions and 
‘Western-centric’ orientations embedded in them.173 Indeed, Foucault’s work debunks the all-too-
familiar universalizing and/or exclusivist project of ‘modernity’ and sociopolitical ‘development’ 
and ‘progress’ that ‘collective oppositional action’ is supposed to inspire and enable. In this way, 
in his analysis of the 1979 revolution with its emphasis on ‘political spirituality,’ Foucault aims to 
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illustrate that “modernity [constitutes a set of] multiple practices” and that it is also tied to, and 
must be understood in relation to, trajectories of people outside Europe.174  
Relatedly, and on another level, part of Foucault’s fascination with the 1979 revolution lies 
with the mode of resistance to the Pahlavi monarchy, i.e., the “political spirituality” that generat-
ed a kind of “political spontaneity on the part of the populace.”175 The latter proved to be a most 
effective surrogate for “the organized political resistance that serve[s] as the impetus for [various] 
forms of [collective action in the ‘West’].”176 Thus, this Foucauldian view of counter-conduct pro-
vides “an alternative account of collective [action],”177  and by implication collective agency, 
wherein cases of collective action can be understood in terms of the “multiple [historical] pro-
cess[es] that constitute [them].”178 Thus, what unfolds is a story of “specific actions in specific con-
texts.”179  
It is apparent from the above discussion that in the Foucauldian conceptualization of coun-
ter-conduct, one can clearly discern a dynamic theoretical framework for analyzing social move-
ments, wherein their ‘conditions of possibility’ are contingent upon a series of historical processes 
and heterogeneous events arising from specific forms of governmental conduct. In such a formu-
lation, mobilization, protestation and contestation “rely upon, and are even implicated within, the 
strategies, techniques and power relationships they oppose,”180 which in turn open up a space to 
analyze social movements based on the diverse “mentalities, practices, [techniques] and subjectiv-
ities” which constitute them.181  
According to this reading, social movements are nothing short of heterogeneous parcels of 
defiance that seek to shape human conduct vis-à-vis governmental power techniques. By way of 
demonstrations and protestations, the actors showcase the collective “political will”182 to change 
and/or contest the status quo. They do so by employing a ‘technology of politicization,’183 the 
purpose of which is to “redeploy the space of appearance” and to “contest and negate the existing 
forms of political legitimacy.”184  
Under these circumstances of collective contestation and refusal, “everything,” Foucault 
contends, “can be politicized, everything may become political”185 insofar as unexpected alliances 
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can be formed, unlikely citizenship claims made, multiple identities/subjectivities enabled and 
repertoires of collective action practiced, remade, and reinvented. This is because ‘revolts of coun-
ter-conduct’ are no less than “work[s] of ethical self-transformation on the part of those who say 
‘no’ to power.”186  
Germane to this ‘process of self-transformation’ is the importance of public spaces as a kind 
of politics, i.e., as a mediator through which social and political conflicts originate and develop. 
Indeed, for the Foucauldian ‘active subject,’ public spaces are crucial as loci for conducting “all 
forms of communal life,”187 and this is especially the case where social and political reform is like-
ly to be blocked or at least impeded by factions possessing a monopoly over power; where open 
political channels simply do not exist; where political parties are simply non-existent and/or their 
function(s) is rudimentary; and/or where oppositional groups are denied political rights—chief 
among them the right to lobby and petition governments and the right of freedom of expression, 
particularly where challenging government policy is concerned. It is under these circumstances 
that such subjects may turn to ‘alternative spaces,’ most often of a public kind to voice their de-
mands, thus transforming them into ‘loci of resistance and defiance.’ In this way spaces are, for 
Foucault, “fundamental in [all] exercise[s] of power.”188 
Thus, just as “all strategies of power and resistance have spatial dimensions,”189 move-
ments of counter-conduct emerge as a consequence of, or are conditioned by, the transformation 
of space by acting subjects into a kind of politics. In this way, protest, contestation, and varied 
forms/arts of resistance work to undermine what Clive Barnett calls “the presumed efficacy of 
…power” manifest in “[its] particular configurations of human bodies in space.”190 Taking ac-
count of this process is crucial, as demonstrated in some of the MENA case studies examined 
above, to understanding how episodes of collective action emerge and develop, and to delineate 
their specificities, i.e., their actors’ techniques, tactics, and modes of resistance, as well as specific 
organizational structures, leadership characteristics, and the spaces converted into domains of 
defiance. This is because—and Saba Mahmood’s remarks bear repeating here—these specificities 
are conditions of, indeed “capacities for”[,] action that specific relations of subordination create 
and enable.”191  
Lastly, once such moments of ‘pure subjectivity’ emerge, politics may often be down-
played or suspended within those domains that are normally its natural milieu, i.e., parliaments, 
congresses and political parties, etc., and yet manifest itself in all manner of unexpected sites and 
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places—urban streets and alleyways, the homes of strangers pressed into service as temporary 
refuges for protestors on the run, or the roof-tops of demonstrators’ homes. This is possible pre-
cisely because oppositional actors are united by a shared condition: “[they] are all governed.”192 It 
is owing to this state of affairs that they derive the sense of solidarity required to contest the gov-
ernmental power that subjugates them. This, for Foucault, represents an ‘aesthetic’ solidarity, 
meaning that it has become ‘historicized’ and ‘stylized.’193 And, as was shown in the above exam-
ple of ‘spatial solidarity,’ this phenomenon can be a starting point from which to examine how 
disparate actors in diverse MENA cases, and others elsewhere in the world, might coalesce into 
movements of social contestation. What makes the concept of ‘spatial solidarity’ especially rele-
vant to the MENA cases investigated here—Iran, Bahrain, and Egypt, among others—is the trans-
formative function of spatial domains, which instils in actors a sense of unity and cohesion even 
in settings that are less than auspicious for mobilization and contestation. Therein, ‘spatial soli-
darity,’ i.e., the merging of a people into a kind of ‘politics of space’ to produce a singular mo-
ment of social contestation and/or social rupture, can function as a template for understanding 
how various episodes of contention in the region emerge, and precisely because it reveals how the 
“most malign … the most well-armed brutal power” can “be resisted [and/or inverted] by the 
force of collective will.”194 In this way, the Foucauldian–inspired notion of ‘spatial solidarity’ can 
serve to facilitate an understanding of how the ‘acting subject’ can recreate him/herself through 
concerted and harmonized action as “a work of art”195 by turning ‘governmental spaces’ into “[lo-
ci for mounting a] corporeal challenge to the norms of political conduct”196— even under the most 
unfavourable circumstances.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has delineated a Foucauldian model of social movements, which, as demonstrated 
above, is better suited, vis-à-vis leading social movement theories, to analyzing MENA move-
ments; and in three respects: first, in transcending many of the difficulties posed by the universal-
istic and grand-casual narratives, which for most of these theories are a staple feature, it provides 
a contextual approach, focusing on the social and political relations that underlie social move-
ments; second, in focusing on the particular localities in which social movements arise, evolve 
and operate, it facilitates an examination of oppositional movements based on the reciprocal rela-
tionship between state and society; lastly, by elucidating the trajectories and experiences of such 
movements, along with the motives that impel their actors to embrace collective forms of action, it 
offers a more historicized account of social movements thus revealing in detail their relations to 
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the specific ‘regimes’ whose power they seek to contest. Herein lies a theoretical approach predi-
cated upon the recognition that episodes of mobilization and collective action are never wholly 
reproducible; rather, they are contingent upon the settings and contexts within which they 
emerge; in other words, each is embedded in a unique historical and social web of relations 
whose specificities must be delineated if the dynamics at play, i.e., the factors and forces driving 
each episode, are to be understood. Thus does a Foucauldian model, with its emphasis on histori-
cal contingency and sensitivity to particular localities, hold out the promise of providing a theo-
retical underpinning sufficiently rigorous to analyze MENA social movements in a way that re-
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